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A RE-EXAMINATION OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1960s
Gary S. Fields

One of the most interesting and controversial.cases of economic de
velopment has been that of Brazil.

Over the decade of the 1960s, the real

rate of economic growth was 79%, with annual rates approaching 10% in the
latter few years.

After allowing for a high population growth rate, the

rate of growth of real income per capita over the decade was still 32%, among
the highest in the Third World.

On this basis, the Brazilian case has been

widely heralded as an "economic mtracle".
More recently however challenges have arisen.

One group of analysts has

looked with disfavor upon social policies which prevailed over the period,
particularly following the rise to power in 1964 of the military government.
A second group has examined the distributional question of who received the
benefits of this growth, and have found greater income inequality according
to conventional measures.

These observations have caused many students of

development to ask whether the high rate of aggregate growth in Brazil was
worth the apparent social and distributional costs.

As a result, there is

at present widespread disagreement about the desirability of taking Brazilian
economic and social policies as a model for other developing countries to
follow, and it is probably fair to say that the Brazilian experience is no
longer regarded

as

"miraculous."

The purµose of this paper is to re-examine one of these two challenges,
namelv, the distributional impact of Brazilian economic growth during the
1960s.

The principal conclusion I reach is that it is possible to arrive
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at a quite different interpretation.

I hope to show that the poor in Brazil

benefited rather substantially in economic terms from a decade of rapid
economic growth.

Estimates presented below indicate that average real incomes

among families defined as poor by Brazilian standards increased by more than

60% while the comparable figure for non-poor families is around 25-30%.

How-

ever, since non-poor families receive incomes which are much greater than
those of poor families, the bulk of the growth of national income over the
decaqe was received by families whose incomes placed them above the official
poverty standard.

These findings may be evaluated differently by various

observers, depending on whether they have in mind an absolute or a relative
definition of poverty.

It would seem clear from these results, though, that

it would be incorrect to say either that (1) in achieving a high rate of
economic growth in Brazil the rich got ahsolutely richer while the poor got
absolutely poorer, or (2) the incomes of poor families increased at a slower
percentage rate than those of non-poor families.
One word of caution.

In presenting these results on the distributional

question, I am ~ot taking a position in favor of the social measures adopted
:in Brazil.
weigh

Conventional economics gives virtually no guidance on how to

the measures used to achieve economic growth against the actual de

velop-ncnt realized, and we are left to relv on personal judgments concerning
matters of social justice.

Personally, I doubt that in the Brazilian case

the m~ans 1ustify the ends, but this is a value judgment, not a scientific
conc.1'.Jsion.
I.

lhsic Results and the Customary Interpretation
The pioneering study of economic growth and the size distribution of

income in Brazil over the decade of the 1960s is that of Fishlow (1972).
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The basic data are reported in Table 1.
Looking first at the level of income, the mean income among the
economically active population in constant U.S. dollars increased from $513
in 1960 to $679 in 1970, a real increase of 32%. 1

~ot shown in the table is

the fact_that growth rates of 9% per annum had been realized during the
latter 1960s (between 1967 and 1970) and have continued thereafter.

This

is the essence of the Brazilian "economic miracle."
At first glance, the data on income distribution seem to tell another
story, however.

We see that the upper 3.2 percent of the economically active

population received 27% of the income in 1960; by 1970, their share had
risen to more than 32%.

In addition, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.59 to

0,63, seemingly implying a less even income distribution.

A second study of

Brazilian growth over the same period, by Langoni (1972), arrives at basically
the same changes in the income distribution. 2
Fishlow's interpretation of these is the following:

"The conclusion that

inequality has increased over the course of the decade accordingly seems
correct, if lamentable." 3

This qualitative result---of a "worsening" income

distribution in Brazil--has been widely accepted. 4
1

This is the percentage increase of "uncorrected incomes" for the
"total economically active population," the only comparison possible with
Fishlow's data.
2

Using slightly different definitions than Fishlow, Langoni found a rise
in the Gini coefficient from 0.49 to 0,56, a falling share of national income
received by each of the four lowest quintiles, and a rising share received
by the richest 5% (from 27.9% to 34.9% of national income).
3
Fishlow (1972, p. 399).
4

See, for instance, the work of Cline (1973) and Figueroa and Weisskoff (1974)
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Contrary to the customary interpretat ion, I wish to suggest that the
Brazilian data are capable of telling a different story.

This is the subject

of Section II.

Table 1
BRAZILIAN SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, 1960
AND 1970, VARIABLE INCOME BRACKETS
Monthly income
in 1960 NCr$
None
0 ..; 2.1
2.1 - 3.3
3.3 - 4.5
4.5 - 6.0
6.0 - 10.0
10.0 - 20.0
20.0 - 50.0
Over 50.0

Percentage
of population

Percentage
of income

14.7%

0.0%

22.3

14.4

5.2
7.0

10.5
13.1
13.8
8.2
2.6
0.5

12.3
20.0
22.2

7.4

16.4
9.4

Mean {Current NCr$)

5.52

Mean (1960 U.S. $ per year)
Cini coefficient

513
.59

Monthly income
in 1970 NCr$
None
0-100
101-150
151-200
201-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-2000
2001 and over
Mean (current NCr$)
Mean (1960 U.S. $ per year)
Cini coefficient
Source:

Percentage
of population

Percentage
of income

11. 7%
31. 7

0.0%
8.0
6.2

12.8'
15.6
4.5
• 14.6
5.9
2.2
1.0

Fishlow (1972, Tables 1 and 5)

10.6

3.9
21. 2
17.1
13.0
20.1

258.1
679
.63
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II. A Re-examination
The fundamental question underlying the analysis of income distribution
in economic development is this:

who (as classified by income class or other

economic or socio-economic criterion) receives the proceeds of economic growth?
The ideal way to answer this question would be to follow the same set of
individuals over a period of time to see how their incomeschange and how
these changes relate to their initial characteristics.

While the type of

longitudinal (or panel) data needed to do this have recently become available
for the United States,

1

no similar data set exists for Brazil, nor to my

knowledge for any other less developed country.

In the absence of longitudinal

data, we must rely on frequency distributions of the population by income
class.

Growth in favor of the rich at the expense of the poor would involve

both (1) an increase in the number of persons in the highest income brackets,
with a reduction in the number in the next lower income brackets, from which
they presumably originated, and (2) an increase in the number of persons in
the- -poorest categories, with a reduction in the number in the next higher in
come brackets, from which they presumably originated.

On the other hand,

a pattern of economic growth which reaches the very poorest as well would
involve (1) a reduction in the number of persons in the poorest income
categories, and (2) an increased frequency in most, if not all, of the other
income classes.
To examine the data for Brazil, the figures presented in Tablel do not

1

There are now three such data files in the United States: the Social
Security LEED file, the University of Michigan panel study, and the National
Longitudinal Study conducted at Ohio State University (commonly referred to
as the Parnes data after the project\s director).
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quite suffice, because they have different income brackets in the two
years.

Lacking the raw data with which to make an exact fit, it is necessarv

to take the income brackets for one year as base and to approximate the
frequency from the other year in each category.

The actual distribution

for 1960 and the approximate values for 1970 are shown in Table 2 and
Figure 1.

1

Table 2
BRAZILIAN SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, ECONOMICALLY
ACTIVE POPULATION, 1960 and 1970,COMPARABLE
INCOME BRACKETS
Monthlv income
in 1960 NCr$
(thousands)

None
0-2.1
2.1-3.3
3.3-4.5
4.5-6.0
6. 0-10. 0
10.0-20.0
20.0-50.0
Over so.a

Percentage
of population,
1960

14.7%
22.3
14.4
10.5
13.1
13.8
8.2
2.6

o.s

Percentage
of population,
1970 (approx.)

11. 7%
23.8
12.2
11.0
14.5
9.4
10.9
5.0
1.6

Cumulative
percentage
of popula
tion 1960
14. 7%
37.0
51.4
61.9
75,0
88.8
97.0
99.6
100.1

Cumulative
percentage
of population
1970 (approx.)

11.7%
35.5
47.7
58.6
73.1
82.5
93.4
98.4
100.0

(;foi coefficient, 1960 = .59
(;ini coefficient, 1970 = .63
1The procedure used to approximate the 1970 distribution is the following.
The mean incomes in 1960 and 1970 were $513 and 679 respectively, both measured
in constant 1960 U.S. dollars. These same means, expressed in current NCr$
were 5,52 and 258.1. Thus, the ratio of the real means was 1.32, and of the
nominal means 46.76. The ratio of these, 35.32 is then an inflation factor which
can be used to deflate the 1970 brackets. For example, the first positive income
bracket in 1970 runs from Oto 2.8 constant NCr$. Then, applying a linear
approximation to the population frequency within each bracket, 2,1/2.8 of
the population in the 0-2.8 category was assigned to the 0-2.1 category, and
the remaining 0,7/2.8 was assigned to the next higher category. An analogous
procedure was followed for the other brackets. It would, of course, have
been better to have used the exact distrih11tion of the economically active
population across thes~ income brackets rather than this approximation; but
owing to the lack of a public use samplP for the microeconomic data, this was
impossible.

-7FIGURE 1.

BRAZilIAN SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, 1960 AND 1970
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The most striking feature of these data is that the cumulative per
centage of population was lower in 1970 than in 1960 for every income hracket.
This means, very simply, that economic growth which took place over the
decade reached persons in all income levels, and not just those at the top.
It should be observed that these figures refer to percentage of the
population; with a growing population, these figures imply that the Brazilian
economy was able to create opportunities for its economically active popu
lation to earn higher incomes at a faster rate than its labor force was ex
panding.

These findings clearly refute the notion that the rich got absolutely

richer while the poor got absolutely poorer in Brazil during the 1960s.
The analysis may be extended to compare the income growth of the poorest
groupswith that of all others.

We may ask four related questions:

(1) Defining "the poor" as those whose incomes were helow a constant
real uoverty line, did the fraction of the economically active population de
fined as "poor" increase or decrease over the decade?
(2) What was the relative increase of incomes among the "poor" as
opposed to the "non-poor"?
(3) How much of the economic growth over the decade went to the

11

poor"

and how much to the "non-poor"?
(4) Defining the "poverty gap" as the amount by which poor persons'
incomes would have to be raised to bring them all up to the poverty line, how
much of the gap was filled during the decade?
We must begin by establishing a poverty standard.

According to Fishlow,

something like 31% of Brazilian families were poor in 1960 by Brazilian

-9-

. . .

d e f 1n1t1ons.

1

Since it is not possible to identify these families exactly,

we may suppose that those persons in the two lowest income brackets, (i.e.,
less then 2.1 NCr$ constant), which in 1960 comprised 37.0% of the population,
were below the poverty line.

From now on, we will refer to these persons

as '·'the poor" and the rest of the population as "the non-poor."
Considering first the question of changing numbers of "poor", we see
from Table 2 that there was a small decrease

in the percentage of the economically

active population with incomes below the poverty line, from 37.0% to 35.5%.
While there was not a higher incidence of poverty in 1970 than in 1960 as
might have been supposed by the rising inequality coefficients, neither was
the incidence substantially reduced.
Next, let us compare the rate of growth of incomes among "the poor" as
opposed to "the non-poor".

Using information about the fraction of the popu

lation defined as "poor" and "non-poor" and the share of income accruing to
each, we can determine the average income in each group in each year.
y

P

and

y·n

be the mean incomes of the "poor" and "non-poor" respectively_ and

P be the population, we have, for

1

Letting

1960,

The poverty line is defined according to Brazilian standards. Says
Fishlow (1972, pp. 393-4): "The real minimum wage for 1960 in the Northeast,
the poorest region, is taken as the lower· limit of acceptable income for a
familv of 4.3 persons. For rural Brazil, the wage prevailing in the rural
areas of the Northeast is taken; for the urban Northeast, the standard of
the medium sized municipio is applied; and for all other unban residents, the
Northeast level, increamented by 15 percent to allow for higher relative prices,
i.s applied. The poverty line for different size families is defined with the
aid of the elastid.ty of expenditure on food with respect to family size;
because of economies of scale larger families need relatively ·less income, and
conversely for smaller."
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and

(1)

(2)

and for 1970,

70

;-p

70

70
and
+ 64.5% P 70;·n 70 = (258.1/35.32)P

(3)

35.5% P

(4)

7
70
8.0%(2.1/2.8) (258.l/35.32)P 0 = 35.5%P70V
·p

Solving,we find:

-

(5)

V

60

··p

= 0.8,

-

y

·p

70

= 1. 3'

-

70
yp
-60
y
p

-

-60
y~

= 63%

and
-60

(n)

y n

= 8.3,

-70
yn = 10.6,

-70
y
n

-

-60
yn

--~=
-60

28%

yn

From (5), we see that "the poor" became noticeably less poor.

Further

more, comparing (5) and (6), we see that the incomes of "the poor" grew at
a rate double that of the "non-poor".

1

This reinforces the earlier observation

that the rich in Brazil did not benefit during the 1960s at the expense of
the poor.
1
Actually, this is an understatement, since some 4% of the "poor" (1.51'./37.0%)
received large enough income increases to raise them above the poverty U.nc,
and their incomes appear as "non-poor" incomes in the above calculati.ons.
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Is the 1970 distribution of incomes between "poor" and "non-poor"
The answer to thi.s question

more or less "equal" than the 1960 distribution?
depends on how one defines "equal."

On

the one hand, if absolute real

income differentials are our standard, we observe

-69
= 7.5,
- y

=

p

9.3,

and we see that the absolute gap widened by about 25%.

However, this gap

was a smaller percentage of per capita income in 1970 than in 1960:

-60
-60
-70
-70
yn - y p
7.5
- yp
= - - = 1. 36, yn
5.2
-60
... 70
Yp
Yp

(8)

= 9.3

= 1. 27,

258.1/35.32

Furthermore, if we take relative income ratios as our standard for comparison,
we find

.

-60/-y60 = 10 4 ,
Y
p
n

(9)

y

70 /
n

y

70

p

= 8.2,

that is, a reduction of the ratio of "non-poor" to "poor" incomes of about
20%.

Personally, I would give heavier weight to the income ratios, for two

reasons.

One is that in any economy in which poverty is being alleviated,

the "ooor" can receive only limited income increases before they cross the
povertythresho ld and are no longer classified as "poor".

Second, we are

often inclined to think of income inequality in an economy in relative terms,
independent of income levels, which implies the need to compare income
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ratios rather than absolute income differentials.

1

I would thus interpret

thesE~ patterns as indicating a relative narrowing of the gap between "poor"
and "non-poor" in Brazil, but others who give heavy weight to absolute in
come differentials would disagree.
Now let us address the question of how much of the economic growth over
the decade went to "the poor" and how much to "the non-poor."

Elsewhere

(Fields (1975)), I have devised a methodology for decomposing
total economic growth into four effects:
= Enlargement of the high income sector
= Change in the number of persons in the high income sector,

multiplied by the income differential between the high income and
low income sectors in the base year;
= Enrichment of the high income sector

0

= Change in income within the 'high income sector, multiplied by the

number of persons in that sector in the base year;
= Interaction between enlargement and enrichment of the high income sector
= Change in income within the high income sector, multiplied by the change

y

in the number of persons in that sector;
= Enrichment of the low income sector
= Change in income within the low income sector, multiplied bv the

6

number of persons in that sector in the terminal year.
The specific formulas, and the numerical results for Brazilian economic
9;rowth <luring the 1960s, are given in Table 3.

1

For an initial attempt to axiomatize static inequalitv measures, see
Fields and Fei (1974).
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ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE 1960s

Importanc e in the economic
Growth Of:
U.S.
Brazil
1959-1%9
1960-1970

Definitio n of
Effect

Effect

----- ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - a

Enlargeme nt of
the "non-poor "
populatio n

6%

19%

a

Enrichmen t of
the "non-poor "
populatio n

82%

72%

2%

8%

10%

1%

16%

20%

100%

100%

y

Interactio n between
enlargeme nt and
(y 70
enrichmen t of
n
the "non-poor "
populatio n

l5

Enrichmen t
of the "poor"
populatio n

-60 )(f 70
n

yll

f.

60\
n

)

-60
-70
- yp) f70
(y
p
p

a +0 sum of "poor"
enlargeme nt
and enrichment effect

TOTAL
where f p =
f

n

=

percentag e of the populatio n which was "poor"
percentag e of the populatio n which was ''non-poor ''

yp =

average income of the "poor" populatio n

yn =

average income of the "non-poor " populatio n
continued on neKt page

-14Table 3 continued
and
Brazil, 1960
f

60
p

r n60

= 37.0%

f

= 63.0%

f

70
p

70
n

-70

= 35.5%

f

= 64.5%

f

·

yp60=

NCr$0.8

y

yn60=

NCr$8.3
.

);70.., NCr$10. 6
n

Sources of data:

p

U.S. 1969

u.s. 1959

Brazil, 1970

59
p

59

p

f

23.8%

=

=
y-59
n

69
p

=

14.9%

in 9 = 85.1%

=76.2%

n

-59

y

=NCr$1. 3

=

-69
U.S.$2,423 y = U,S,$2,689
p

u.s.$10,774

-69
y =
n

u~s.

12,343

Brazil--text

United States--Statist ical Abstract of the United States {1971),
Tables 485, 512, 513, 515, 517.

FIGURE 2.

POVERTY GAP IN BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970
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The outstanding result is that the bulk of economic growth in Brazil
accrued to persons who had been above the poverty line in 1960.
growth, only about 16% went to "the poor."

Of the total

Of this, six percentage points

went to elevating formerly poor persons above the poverty line, while the
other ten percentage points served to make "the poor" somewhat less poor.
Before arriving at a qualitative judgment about this pattern, two
considerations should be borne in mind.

For one thing, it is not really

surprising that most of the economic growth of a country would be received
by the non-po_or.

This is partly because higher income persons have superior

access to income-earning opportunities; partly because many countries develop
by creating more employment of professional and skilled workers, who are
likely to have been earning above the poverty line to begin with; and partly
because of the simple mathematical fact that the poor cannot receive a very
large share of the income growth before they are no longer poor.

In addition,

if we compare the percentage of growth accruing to the "poor" in Brazil (16%)
with the same figure for the United States for the same decade (20%), we find
that the results are not very different, despite the reputation of the U.S.
as a relatively more egalitarian society.

Thus, the pattern observed for

Brazil may be a bit more understandable.
Finally, we may examine the extent to which the Brazilian economy closed
its "poverty gap" during the 1960s.

The poverty gap, is calculated as the

sum of the differences between each poor person's (or family's) income and
the poverty line.

This concept may be illustrated with the aid of Figure 2.

Poor persons in 1960, who comprised 37.0% of the population received
average income of NCr$0.8.

The poverty gap then was:

an

-16-

(10)

Poverty gap in 1960
= (poverty line minus mean income of persons below the poverty

line in 1960)
X (Population below the poverty line)
a

($2.1 - $0.8) x 37.0%P

=

48.1% P,

where Pis the economically active population, and is illustrated by the area
AB60 c60 D6o.
Similarly, for 1970, we have
(11)

Poverty gap in 1970
=

($2.1 - $1.3) x 3S.S%P.

= $28.4% P,

given by area AB 70 c

70 70

n

in Figure 2.

Expressed as a percentage of population,

the amount of the poverty gap made up during the 1960s is the sum of two
components:

that part of the increase in incomes which elevated some of the

poor up to the poverty line (B

70 60 60
B C C'), plus the increase in incomes of

those who remained below the line (n 70 c 70 c 1 n60 ).

For Brazil between 1960

and 1970, the amount made up was:
(12)

Poverty gap made up
=

(Gap between poverty line and mean income of "the poor"
in 1960) x (Percentage of "poor" elevated above the poverty line)

+ (Change in mean income of "the poor" between 1960 and 1970)
x (Percentage of "poor" remaining poor)
=

[($2.1 - $0.8) x 1.5%PI+ [($1.3-0.8) x 3S.5%P]

= $19.9%P.

The percentage of the poverty gap made up in Brazil over the decade is the
ratio of (12) to (10) or 41%.
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Coincidentally, in the United States, the poverty gap was reduced by
exactly the same percentage, 41%, over the same period, much of which com
prised the "War on Poverty" years of the Johnson administration.

1

Although

the percentage reduction was the same in the two countries, their patterns
differed noticeably, as may be seen from the following figures:

Brazil
1960-1970

United States
1959-1969

Percentage Reduction
in Poverty Gap

41%

41%

Percentage Reduction
in Fraction "Poor"

5%

33%

38%

20%

10%

61%

Percentage Reduction in Percentage
Difference Between Average Income
of "The Poor" and the Poverty Line
Fraction of Poverty Gap Reduction
Attributable to Smaller Fraction
of Population Below the Poverty
Line

The differences may be illustrated by comparing Figures 2 and 3.
We observe that in Brazil, the poverty gap reduction took the form of sub
stantially raising the incomes of "the poer" while elevating relatively few
above the poverty line.

In the United States, in contrast, the fraction "poor"

was reduced by one-third, but those who remained "poor" were helped relatively
less by a decade of growth than in Brazil.

1 statistical abstract of the United States (1971, Table 517)

-18FIGURE 3
POVERTY GAP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1959 AND 1969
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III. How it Happened
How was the Brazilian economy able to shift its entire income distri
bution and eliminate a considerable percentage of its poverty gap during a
decade of growth?

The basic dimensions of change are given in Table 4.

We begin by observing that for three-quarters of that country's economi
cally active population, wages were the only source of income, and the income
received by wage-earners was 71% of the total.

It follows, therefore, that

the changing income distribution has its primary origin in a changing labor
market.
Sections Band C document the familiar notions that incomes are higher
in urban than rural areas, and higher in industry than in agriculture.

Thus,

a shifting income distribution and reduction of poverty could result from
the transfer of the population from rural agriculture to urban areas in general
and to the industrial sector in particular.
In Sections D-F, we see that that is just what happened.

The urban popu

lation grew nearly twice as fast as the total population and more than six
times faster than the rural population, which can only be due to substantial
rural-urban migration.

Output in the industrial sector grew at an above

average rate (96% opposed to an average of 79%) while agricultural sector
output growth was below average (53%).
are even more marked:

The differences in employment growth

77% growth of the industrial sector, and only 9% in

agriculture.
The changing sectoral distribution of the labor force is reflected as
well in the occupational distribution (Section F).

The number of jobs at

the lowest occupational levels (more or less the equivalent of unskilled,
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menial labor) increased by just 2% over the decade, while the number of
jobs at higher ,_evels doubled.

Consequentl y, the importance of "primary

jobs" fell from 54% to 43% of total employment.
Finally, we may note that labor force participatio n increased over the
decade, ~ue to dramatic increases in the employment of women in every age
group.

On the other hand, there were noticeable but relatively small de

clines in employment rates for men, particularl y the very young and very old.
The increased employment of women is likely to represent an influx of previously underutilize d human capital, with consequent increases in wage levels.
What caused labor market conditions to change?

1

During the 1960s Brazil

shifted toward an export-prom otion development strategy and away from a policy
of import-sub stitution,

In Brazil as in many other less developed countries,

it is generally thought that import-sub stitution was accompanied by factor
price distortions which •indered employment growth by favoring capital-in2
The export-prom otion phase, beginning
tensive techniques in manufacturi ng.
in 1964, raised capital costs by means of monetary correction and lowered
labor costs via wage controls.

The expected result was more labor intensive

production, which indeed took place (see Section I).

The likely consequence s

1

Recall that the income distributio n figures presented above refer to
the economicall y active population. It may be presumed that size distributio n
of income among families became more equal (or less unequal) than the dis
tribution among persons, insofar as many of these women are "secondary"
workers" whose earnings supplement those of their husbands.
2

But for a constrastin g view of the labor absorption experience during
the import substitutio n phase, see Morley and Williamson (1974).
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of greater labor intensiveness on income distribution would be a) a
narrowing of the wage structure, b) more employment of the previously-un
employed, presumably at the lower occupational levels, but also c) more
employment at higher levels, (i.e., a more unequal occupational struct.ur·e),
and therefore the possibility of greater measured inequality, which we have
observed.
In summary, we may conclude that the changing income distribution in
Brazil resulted largely from changing labor market conditions, in particular:
(1) A relatively high rate of growth of output and employment in the
relatively high-paying urban sector;
(2) A relatively high rate of growth of output and employment in the
relatively high-paying industrial sector;
(3) A relative expansion of employment in "modern sector" occupations;
(4) 6hanging labor force composition away from the very young and very
old :i.n favor of prime-age women, who are apt to be more productive than those
whom

they replaced in the labor force.
Furthermore, the changing labor market conditions seem in turn to have

been caused at least in part by a shift to an export-promotio n development
strategy.

-22Table 4
SOME ASPECTS OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
DURING THE 1960s

A.

B.

c.

Income Source, 1970a
Wage earners as percentage of income
recipients
Income received by wage-earners as
percentage of total

71%

Median Earned inco~e by rural-ruban,
1960 (approximate)
Urban and suburban households

Cr$1,250

74%

Median Earned income by economic sector,
1970 (approximate)c
Industrial

NCr $195
110
165

Agriculture
All sectors
D.

E.

F.

G.

Population (in Millions)d

1960

1970

Growth

Total
Urban
Rural

70.1
32.5
37.6

93. 2
52.1
41.1

33%
60%
9%

261.4
156.1
205.7

511.8
239.5
368.5

96%
53%
79%

Employment by sector
(in Millions) f
Industrial
Agriculture
Total economically active
population

3.0
12.2

5.8
13.1

77%

22.6

29.5

30%

Employment by occupational
type (in thousands)g
Primary: agricultural
activities, vegetable
extraction, and fishing

12,271

12,533

Real output by sector
1949 = lOOe
Industrial
Agriculture
Total real product

9%

2%

continued

-23Secondary: Mineral extraction,
industrial production and
services, and constructio n
Terciary: Professiona ls, sellers
of services (including repairmen
and domestic workers), merchants,
transport and communicati on workers
and civil servants (including police
and army)
H.

I.

2,791

5,476

5,341

11,082

96%

107%

Rate of EmEloyment as Eercentage
of po~ulation in Each Age-Sex
Group

1960

1969

Men
15-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 +
Men 15 and over

72.4%
92.3
97.2
96.9
94.0
83.2
59.1
88.6%

68.2%
89.3
96.0
95.8
92.5
81.5
51.4
84.8%

Women
15-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 +
Women 15 and over

23.4%
22.5
17.8
17.1
15.6
12.6
8.5
"""""fs.""4%

37.4%
41.7
36. 3
34. 2
31.0
22.7
10.0
33.6%

Employment /output ratio
by sector )t
Agriculture
Industry
Services

1960

1968-70

% change

2.27
.52
.49

2.50
.63
.68

+10%
+20%
+38%

Notes to Table 4:
a) Comision Economica para America
Latina (1974), p. 22
b) Brasil (1960) , Table 6
c) Brasil (1970), Table 8
d) Brasil (1960), Table 1 and
Brasil (1970), Table 1

e) Fundacao Getulio Vargas (1973),
Table 2
f) Brasil (1970), Table V
g) Singer (1971), Tables 2JV, 2.VI
h) Singer (1971), Table I.I
i) Wogart (1974), Table 6
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IV. Conclusions
The conventional wisdom concerning Brazilian economic development over
the 1960-1970 period may be summarized by three propositions:
(1) The absolute rate of growth was very high.
(2). Income distribution worsened over the period.

(3) Significant social and political costs were paid.
As a result, many writers have questioned whether the higher rate of economic
growth was "worth it."
Without addressing the issue of social and political costs and accepting
the finding that aggregate growth was very rapid over the decade, this paper
has re-examined the income distributional consequences of _Brazilian economic
development over the 1960s.

Among the findings are the following:

(1) The entire income distribution shifted, benefiting every income class.
(2) There was a small decline in the fraction of the economically active
population classified as below the poverty line, but those who remained "poor"
received markedly higher incomes.
(3) The percentage increase in incomes for those below the poverty line
was more than double that of those above the poverty line.
(4) The relative income gap between "poor" and "non-poor" persons
narrowed in terms of ratios but widened absolutely.
(5) The bulk of the income growth over the decade accrued to persons
above the poverty line.

However, a similar pattern is observed for the

United States, an allegedly more egalitarian society.
(6) The poverty gap in Brazil was reduced by 41% between 1960 and 1970.
The United States reduced its poverty gap by exactly the same percentage
over the same decade,
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(7) The patterns of production and employment in the Brazilian economy
shifted over the decade in favor of the relatively advanced and high-paying
sectors:

urban areas, the industrial sector, and relatively high-level

occupations.
These findings cast considerable doubt on the convent•i'()nal

wisdom

concerning the distributional consequences of Brazilian economic growth.
At minimum, the notion that "the rich got rich at the expense of the poor"
receives no support in the data examined here.

Furthermore, while the very

richest (i.e., top 5%) benefited over the decade, we :also see that in several
respects, the "poor" benefited relative to the "non-poor."
by asking a qualitative question:

We· might conclude

despite a rising share of income going

to the very richest and rising Gini coefficient, did the Brazilian size
distribution of income really worsen?

1

1

After completing the draft of this paper, I learned that Morley and
Williamson (1974) have also questioned whether a rising Gini coefficient
really signifies reduced social welfare. Their observation pertains to
Brazilian growth over the 1949-62 period.
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